T he most tangible change since China's economic reform began in 1978 is occurring in the vast and unurbanized countryside. This change, as Huang (1990, pp. 252-65) pointed out, was brought about not by the development of traditional agriculture, but by the emergence of an entirely new structure: rural entrepreneurship or, as he called it, rural industrialization. In China in 1986, over six million rural enterprises employed 47.6 million people. These enterprises generated 2,413 billion Yuan of industrial output, almost one-fourth of the total national industrial output, and over five times the 1978 figure. By 1990, rural industries employed 92.6 million peasants and accounted for nearly one-third of the national industrial output (Statistical Bureau 1991) . By the year 2000, rural industry is projected to be one-half of the national economy (Wang 1991).
Rural industrialization in China was prompted by a structural imperative -the accumulation of surplus labor in rural area generated by population growth. In the 25 years from 1952 to 1977, China's rural population grew by 55.6 percent while total arable land fell by 21.4 million acres (130 million mu). Arable land per farmer dropped converted into a new form of industrial work force. This new form of organization and social structure differs from the old system and it may operate with rules and mechanisms different from those of the bureaucratic hierarchy in the urban state sector. Nee (1989 Nee ( , 1991 has offered a systematic analysis of marketization and its consequences for the stratification structure of rural China. In a study of peasant households in Fujian, Nee found that market reform disrupted the old redistributive hierarchy: Ordinary peasants, previously powerless and underprivileged, benefited from new opportunities opened up by reform, whereas the redistributive power of the old cadres was weakened. (Cadres here refer to bureaucrats and para-bureaucrats in the redistributive system). Huang (1990) criticized the notion of market opportunities and portrayed the rise of peasant entrepreneurship as "rural industrialization without residential urbanization and stratification by bureaucratic hierarchy" (p. 288). I compare the new structure with the old structure and ask: Do the principles of wage stratification with regard to education, experience, tenure, age, and occupation differ among (1) urban state industrial firms, (2) rural public enterprises, and (3) rural private enterprises and, if so, in what ways?
THEORY: OWNERSHIP, MARKETS, AND WAGE DETERMINATION
Stratification regimes reflect coordination mechanisms. Kornai (1986 Kornai ( , 1989 Kornai ( , 1990 ) defined two ideal types of coordination: bureaucratic and market. Bureaucratic coordination is characterized by a vertical relationship between multilevel bureaucracies and individuals or firms. Bureaucracies allocate resources and redistribute income. Market coordination is characterized by a horizontal relationship between profit-seeking economic entities (individuals or firms). Transactions are carried out at prices agreed upon by legally equal buyers and sellers. Bureaucratic-coordinated firms run under soft budget constraints, i.e., their survival is automatically guaranteed by the redistribution of profits; market-coordinated firms operate with hard budget constraints, i.e., their survival depends on calculating proceeds from sales and cost of input. Firms under soft budget constraints have an insatiable hunger, not forprofits, but for investment of capital and input of labor -hence, low efficiency and overall shortage. Kornai (1990) stated that bureaucratic coordination is the inevitable consequence of public property, just as market coordination is the inevitable consequence of private property: "Bureaucratic coordination is as much the spontaneous effect and natural mode of state property's existence as market coordination is of private property" (p. 59). To property-rights theorists, coordination mechanisms and soft/hard budget constraints are completely determined by property relations. Thus, the question of coordination mechanisms is reduced to that of property rights.
According to Kornai, market socialism is a myth and the belief that market operation can be simulated through bureaucratic coordination is at best a false hope. The Hungarian experiment before the collapse of Communism and the Chinese urban reform to date show that the marriage between bureaucratic and market coordination does not produce the best of the two -the firm's vertical dependence on the bureaucracy predominates and weakens its horizontal dependence on the market. Thus, market coordination within state ownership never works because bureaucracy has a built-in need for excessive intervention.
Rural enterprises in China consist of different types of ownership: townships (Zhen), communes (Xiang), villages (Cun), production teams (Dui), partnerships, and private individuals/households.2 Township/commune government, the lowest level of formal state structure, functions as an administrative organ and as the owner of rural enterprises. In this sense, township/commune enterprises are publicly-owned. Although township/ commune governments after the reform still performed some redistributive functions, village "government" was stripped of those functions (Nee and Young 1991, pp. 295-96). Because village cadres are not on the public payroll, ownership of village enterprises is ambiguous. They may be "collective" in the sense of partnership, but they are more properly characterized as semiprivate. A dominant share of rural industrial output is contributed by enterprises owned by township/commune and village governments (Byrd 1990, p. 195) .
From the perspective of property-rights theory, the diversity of ownership within rural indus-2 Bureaucratic control once reached beyond the village level to the production teams. However, economic reform in the countryside since 1979 has virtually dismantled production teams as basic production units. Collective ownership of production teams become more nominal than real. Little of the agricultural management function was left for township and village governments either and they took up the expanding rural industries. try should produce diversity in the stratification of power, prestige, and earnings. Township/commune enterprises should differ from private or semiprivate enterprises because township/commune enterprises are subject to intervention from their owners, the local governments. Because of the similarity in ownership between state-run urban firms and rural public enterprises, occupations, wages, power, and prestige should be stratified by the similar processes in both sectors, while these processes should differ in rural private enterprises which operate in a market system.
To some observers of China's rural industry, however, the distinction between rural public and rural private sectors makes little sense. Huang (1990) maintained that township/commune firms are no different from other rural firms when competing for materials and bank loans trickled down from redistributors in the urban center. Survival of rural firms depends on a "gray market" and is not guaranteed by the softness of the state budget. Gelb (1990) found few major differences between community-owned firms and private firms in China's rural industry, possibly because private enterprises need close ties with local government to obtain business licenses and to secure land, bank loans, and so on. The fragile nature of private property rights may also be a factor. This line of argument has merit. On the one hand, local cadres on the township and commune level may have become less bureaucratic and more "entrepreneurial" after being cut off from central planners and redistributors. Kornai's observation that it is the inherent nature of bureaucratic power to intervene was derived from the Hungarian experience; but Hungary's small size may have allowed the central government to exercise ubiquitous control. The immense size of China, by contrast, meant that the central government could not keep tight control on everything and had to decentralize by relegating some control to local authorities. Konrad and Szelenyi (1979, p. 57) observed that the Chinese state organization resembled the traditional redistributive system more than it did the Soviet model of rational redistribution, though it was no less bureaucratic. The formal redistributive apparatus in China never worked its way from the top to the bottom; central redistribution drew only a comparatively small fraction of the social product into the state budget. It is well documented that local governments in Chinese cities muster their own resources and immediately form new "mini" bureaucratic control centers when the national government loosens control (Hua, Zhang, and Luo 1988; Lin 1989; Shirk 1989 Rural and urban industry in China are essentially mutually exclusive systems with little movement of labor between them. Free mobility from the rural to the urban state sector has been effectively blocked since the late 1950s by the household registration system (cf. Potter 1983). Although the recent liberalization of the economy has produced an influx of peasants to the cities seeking temporary jobs in the private sector, a farmer cannot secure a niche in a state unit without urban residence registration. At the same time, few city dwellers want to move to a rural factory. In the survey of urban state firm employees analyzed here, more than one-half of the respondents had considered changing jobs. But only .7 percent of them indicated a willingness to move to a rural collective factory. The majority of potential movers were willing to move only within the urban state sector. Although there are frequent reports of rural enterprises hiring retired highlyskilled urban workers and technicians to help improve technology, this should be interpreted as technological "trickle-down" from urban to rural industry rather than as a general mobility trend.
THE WAGE DETERMINATION PROCESS
In this study I investigate one aspect of coordination mechanisms: the wage determination process. Though the structure of wage determination is not a sufficient indicator of the coordination mechanism, it is certainly a necessary indicator of the presence or absence of a labor market. It is the commodification of labor rather than sheer production for exchange that initiated and continues to propel capitalist development in the West (Marx [1953] 1964; Brenner 1977, pp. 32, 50-51). Huang (1990, pp. 110-14) showed that "involutionary" commercialization in Ming-Qing Yangzi Delta did not increase labor productivity because family commodity production did not calculate labor costs. Therefore, comparative analyses of wage determination should reveal a crucial aspect of coordination mechanisms.
Human capital theories predict individuals' earnings from their investment in human capital, mainly schooling and work experience. I define the earnings determination mechanism in accordance with the routine wage equation used by human capital theorists. The typical wage equation of human capital theory uses age as indicator of work experience and includes quadratic terms for age and education to capture the parabolic ageincome profile and the increasing returns to education (Mincer 1974 In addition to age, I include seniority (defined as total years of work experience) and tenure (defined as years in the present firm). The effect of seniority net of tenure indicates the monetary return granted by the present firm to a worker's previous training. The effect of tenure net of seniority indicates the benefit of remaining in the present firm over and above the return to previous experience, i.e., the effect of firm-specific human capital.
The gender gap in earnings in capitalist societies is well-known (Treiman and Roos 1983). In China, wage equality between women and men is legally guaranteed. Therefore, gender should not be a factor in wage determination (at least not in the state sector).3 Why should human capital perform differently in market as opposed to command economies? Do not education and on-the-job training affect workers' wage levels in socialist society? Indeed, "schooling certificate" (Xueli) and "seniority" (Gongling) are key words used by Chinese factory workers to argue for higher salaries. A particular year of entrance into the state sector or a particular level of school diploma have been used to determine the eligibility for pay increases and housing allocation.
In the ideal labor market, human capital factors affect wage levels through negotiations between free employers and employees. In state socialism, however, human capital factors influence wages through a rigid set of bureaucratic regulations. Until recently, workers in China's state factories were not free to change jobs. Wages were determined largely by a single schedule, applied throughout the country. China's labor system has gone through rapid changes, but state officials have tenaciously refused to recognize labor as a commodity. Although they have tried to design a wage system that reflects labor productivity, their efforts have proved futile. Walder (1986, 1987) observed that the implementation of a bonus system in state factories -a major component of wage reform -failed to link performance and reward because managers were pressured by workers into distributing bonuses in a regular and egalitarian fashion. Bonuses supposedly come out of the profits retained by firms, but because of the irrational price system, firm profits do not reflect efficiency. With soft budgets, even firms operating at a loss manage to mete out bonuses. The initial loosening of the strict state control over wage bills resulted in a massive increase in the cost of labor without producing any incentives for better work performance (Walder 1987; Shirk 1985, p. 202). Bureaucrats are no better at figuring out the "true market value" of labor than that of any other commodity.
In market-coordinated economies, wages tend to reflect productivity, whereas in bureaucraticcoordinated economies this connection is distorted. In bureaucratic-coordinated economies, credentials are important because cultural capital is the dominant form of capital in state socialism. I predict that a close link exists between performance and reward in China's rural private enterprises and that egalitarianism compresses wage differentials in urban state industry. Consequently, human capital characteristics and occupational position should have stronger effects on wages in the rural private sector than they do in the urban state sector. Predictions for rural public industries are more difficult.
The wage determination process is summarized by the following equation:
where ln(W) is the log of income; E, are dummy variables for educational levels of junior high school, senior high school, and college respectively (the omitted category is no education or primary school only); A is age; A2 is age squared; S is seniority (total years of work experience); T is tenure (years in current firm); and G is a dummy variable coded "1" for males and "0" for females. In a preliminary analysis, I included quadratic terms for age, seniority, and tenure to determine their functional relationship with income. However, only age squared had significant independent effect and is therefore retained in the analysis. Occupation is the intermediate link between human capital factors and earnings and is also an independent determinant of income. Therefore, I estimate the following wage equation that adds occupation variables to equation 1:
ln(W) = fl1(E) + fl2(E,) +fl3(E3) +fl4(A) +-J35(A2) +A6(S) +ff7(T +J8(G)J39(OI) +fl0(02) +]3 1(03) +fl2(04) + F, (2)
where 0 are occupation dummy variables for group/shift leaders, clerical cadres, technical staff, and middle-level cadres (the omitted category is manual workers). These occupational groups are derived from rather crude classifications and are not precisely comparable in the rural and urban surveys. Therefore, comparisons between the two surveys must be made with caution.
The central question for analysis can be reformulated as: Do the three industrial sectors (urban state, rural public, and rural private) differ with I Gender may also interact with other variables. Treiman and Terrell (1975) observed that the education-earnings and age-earnings profiles differ for women and men in the U.S. In a preliminary analysis, I included interactions of gender with the other independent variables, but none were significant. regard to the structure of wage determination as specified by the two equations?
MODELS
There are four theoretically meaningful outcomes based on comparisons of the wage determination processes in the urban state sector, the rural public sector, and the rural private/semiprivate sector. I call these uniform structure, public-private duality, rural-urban duality, and unique structure. Urban collective and private firms, which are overshadowed by state-owned firms, are not considered here. The four outcomes are illustrated in Figure 1 .
(1) Uniform structure. All three sectors (rural private, rural public, and urban state) may have the same basic structure of earnings determination, i.e., neither the rural versus urban distinction or the private versus public ownership distinction matters. This model is logically possible but implies an uncomfortable combination of Huang's "gray market" theory and Song's convergence theory.
(2) Public-private duality. The model hypothesizes similarity in earnings determination between the urban state and rural public sectors. These sectors in turn differ from the rural private sector in earnings determination. This hypothesis derives from theories of property rights, which view forms of property ownership as crucial in deciding the nature and behavior of firms. Because rural public firms are owned by the local government, wage determination in the rural public sector should be under as much bureaucratic control as it is in state-owned firms. This argument is consistent with Song's convergence thesis.
(3) Rural-urban duality. The model hypothesizes similarity in wage determination process between the rural public and rural private sectors. It reflects the observation that rural industry in China is an entirely new phenomenon. Local government-owned and privately or semiprivately owned firms operate under the same market conditions. Hence, they should have similar wagedetermination mechanisms, which in turn differ from those in the urban state sector. This model is consistent with Nee's market transition theory and Huang's "gray market" thesis.
(4) Unique structure. A fourth possibility is that the wage determination operates uniquely in each of the three sectors. The redistributive state sector may be at one extreme and the market-regulated rural private sector at the other extreme, with the rural public sector somewhere in between. The urban state sector is largely under bureaucratic control/protection and wages are determined by bureaucratic rules. Rural public enterprises are less bureaucratized but are owned by local government, which is bound to intervene. Rural private firms are under no bureaucratic control and wages are determined in a free labor market. This model has a certain appeal because it incorporates features of three of the four theoretical perspectives (there is no convergence).
DATA AND MEASURES
Data are from two sample surveys. A survey of Chinese urban workers in state-owned firms (broadly defined to include technical and managerial personnel) was conducted by the Economic Reform Institute of China in December 1986. This sample consists of 1,002 employees drawn from 100 state-owned firms in six cities (Shanghai, Wuhan, Xianyang, Datung, Chengdu, and where S is the expected total work experience; T is tenure; and M, are dummy variables for number of job changes (M5 is five to eight job changes). The equation was estimated using the 701 cases with valid values on total work experience, tenure, and number of job changes (R2 = .568). Twenty-nine cases were retrieved using this equation. If the interviewers' consistency in interpretation and the respondents' intelligence and understanding can be trusted, these categories should be reasonably comparable between the two surveys, but they are not identical.
RESULTS
Examining the wage determination process between any two sectors involves testing the significance of the differences between coefficients in the two regression equations. The most convenient method uses the multi-sample procedure available in structural equation software like LIS-REL (Joreskog and Sorbom 1989) and EQS (Bentler 1989 ). Both procedures can impose equality on the regression coefficients across sampies and produce chi-square statistics for the whole model (Bentler 1989) . If cross-sample equality constraints produce a large increment in chi-square, the data do not support the hypothesis of similar structure of wage determination.
The four hypothetical models are tested by comparing total chi-square statistics. After selecting the best model, a few individual parameters are fine-tuned. Model 1, uniform structure, is specified by equating corresponding regression coefficients in all three sectors. Model 2, public-private duality, is specified by imposing equality constraints on the rural public and urban state sectors while allowing the coefficients for the rural private sector to vary. Model 3, ruralurban duality, is specified by imposing equality constraints on the rural private and rural public sectors while allowing the coefficients for the urban state sector to vary. Model 4, unique structure, imposes no cross-sample equality constraints. Since Model 4 is saturated, all the other models are nested under it. Test results are summarized in Table 3.5 For equations 1 and 2, the model of rural-urban duality is the better of the two models that fit the data (Models 3 and 4) . The large chi-squares for the uniform structure and public-private duality models indicate that neither model adequately reproduces the covariance matrices. Since Model 4 imposes no constraints, it fits the data perfectly (chi-square = 0). For equation 1 (without occupation), imposing equality between the rural private and rural public sectors generated a chi-square increment of only 8.2, which is not significant with 8 degrees of freedom. For equation 2 (with occupation), the same constraints produced a chi-square of 17.0, which is also not I I do not consider the theoretically implausible possibility that the rural private and urban state sectors have similar structures that in turn differ from the rural public structure. I tested this model and it did not fit. significant with 12 degrees of freedom. This similarity between the rural sectors indicates that the ownership distinction in China's rural industry is not reflected in the wage determination process as property-rights theory predicts. The "publicness" or "collectiveness" of township and commune enterprises does not make their wage stratification much different from wage stratification in rural private enterprises.
The fact that equality constraints across the rural-urban sectors in Models 1 and 2 produce a drastic increase in chi-square confirms the superiority of the rural-urban duality model. The hypothesis of rural-urban convergence must be rejected: Income is stratified according to different mechanisms in rural public industry and in urban state industry.6
The test results for Model 1 and Model 2 under equation 2 should be viewed with caution because they involve equality constraints on occupations between the two surveys and occupations in the two samples are probably not fully comparable.
The global chi-square tests indicate overall similarity in earnings determination, but they say nothing about specific equality constraints. Examination of the univariate chi-square increase for each constraint reveals that a large portion of the chi-square in Model 3 of equation 1 results from the equality constraint on the effect of tenure. Relaxing this constraint decreased the chisquare for the whole model by 5.1, which is a significant decrease with 1 degree of freedom. This indicates that the effect of tenure differs between the rural public and rural private sectors. On the other hand, imposing an equality constraint on the effect of work experience across the rural and urban sectors did not produce a significant increase in the total chi-square. This indicates that there is no rural-urban difference in this coefficient. Thus, the final model for equation 1 is one of rural homogeneity with the exception of the effect of tenure and rural-urban duality with the exception of the effect of work experience.
Similarly, Model 3 of equation 2 can be finetuned by relaxing the constraint on the effect of tenure. This reduces the total chi-square significantly, from 17.0 to 12.4. The metric regression coefficients and their z-tests for these two final models are presented in Table 4 .
INTERPRETATION
It is perhaps more interesting to analyze the specific differences in human capital effects on earnings and the connections of these differences with institutional arrangements. I focus on equation 1 of Table 4 because the problematic comparability of occupational categories across rural and urban samples may distort comparisons of human capital effects. Also, it is preferable to examine the total effects of human capital rather than just looking at residual effects after eliminating the primary intervening link of occupation.
Education effects for the rural and urban sectors tell different stories. The education-income relation for the urban state sector is slightly concave, reaching its bottom at junior high school and then ascending. The education-income function in the rural sectors is slightly convex, reaching its "peak" at junior high and then declining. Because the dependent variable is the log of income, coefficients can be interpreted as percentage increases or decreases. For the urban sector, the expected net "return" to income from no school or primary school to junior high school is about a 1 percent decrease (e0 ?' l -1); from junior high to senior high is a 1.7 percent increase (e.0051(0"1) 1); and from senior high to college an 11 percent increase. For the rural sectors, the net "return" to income from no school or primary school to junior high school is a 7 percent increase; from junior high to senior high is a 1 percent decrease; and from senior high to college another 15 percent decrease.
These results for the urban state sector are not surprising because this sector operates under a relatively rigid credentialed wage system. Tertiary education generates a return to income by default, and secondary schooling brings virtually no benefit because it is not considered a credential. In the rural sector, by contrast, college education produces a negative return. Since these are crosssectional data, "returns" are actually betweengroup differences, i.e., with age, tenure, work experience, and gender statistically controlled, college-educated workers in rural firms earn 10 percent less than those who had only primary schooling or never attend school, and 16 percent less (e 104 -.068 -1) than those who finished junior high school. However, these figures should be treated cautiously: The 10 percent differential be6According to a report by the Center of Rural Studies (1986, p. 365), a research institute affiliated with the State Council of China, the industrial composition of the rural nonagricultural sector is strikingly similar to that of urban sector. Thus, the rural-urban difference in wage determination is not due to differences in industrial composition. tween the college group and the group with no schooling or primary schooling only is not statistically significant, and the 16 percent difference between college and junior high school level is only marginally significant.7 Nevertheless, we can see that college graduates in rural industry did not compete favorably with high school graduatescompared with their peers in the cities, they reaped little return to their education.
One interpretation for the lack of positive returns to higher education in rural enterprises is that it results from an unbalanced selection process. Rural industry is attractive to rural high school graduates who have little possibility of moving to a city, but it is undesirable to most college graduates because they usually secure a job in a city. Hence, it is the best rural high school graduates and the worst college graduates who are selected into rural industries. The earnings differential is a consequence of this selection process.
I The computed z-score is 1.72, which is significant at the .05 level, one-tailed. The variance of the difference between two coefficients is computed as the sum of the two coefficients' variances minus twice their covariance. The z-tests are based on the 19 respondents in the rural sample who had any kind of tertiary education. In his analysis of the full data set from four counties, Gelb (1990, p. 297) found that not only was education an insignificant factor determining wages, but when it was (marginally) significant, it went in the wrong direction. However, he is wrong to suggest that zero or even negative differentials at higher educational levels may be common in China, as my data show that that is not the case in the urban state sector. A human capital interpretation consistent with Nee's market transition thesis suggests that highlevel education fails to bring monetary return in rural industry because of the current low level of technological development. Formal higher education may not lead to higher productivity when there is little need for "high tech" skills. Therefore, in the rural market place where productivity is the primary consideration for rewards, tertiary education becomes an inferior kind of human capital compared with "life experience" and onthe-job training. In the still largely redistributive urban state sector, by contrast, formal education carries not only human capital (expertise) but cultural capital (credentials) as well. As Szelenyi ( 1988, p. 74) pointed out, bureaucratic redistribution systems reward cultural capital more than human capital. In China's state factories, pay differentials between different education levels, though not large, are written into the remuneration system. The human capital side of education may or may not bring extra monetary benefit. Most rural enterprises employ piece-rate and "floatingwage" systems (Gelb 1990, p. 285) . Education is rewarded only to the extent it enhances productivity. For example, employees listed as technicians are actually highly compensated. If it so happens that a college education is overkill, there is no formal institutional arrangement to guarantee its higher return. Therefore, the zero or even negative return to college education in rural sectors may, in part, reflect the indifference of the rural gray market to cultural capital. This result is not merely a Chinese aberration. Szelenyi (1988, p. 123) found that both "too much" and "too little" education worked against embourgeoisement in rural Hungary. Thus, it is not that education in general does not pay in China's rural labor market, only that formal tertiary education produces no increment over what those with secondary schooling earn. This is a subtle issue that requires further investigation.
Seniority, or total years of work experience, has a similar effect in all sectors. When the effect of tenure is controlled, the coefficient for seniority indicates the return to general training gained from previous work. The return to the present work experience is the seniority effect plus the tenure effect. In other words, the "tenure effect" stands for the additional benefit accruing from each year of employment in the present firm over and above that gained for each year of work experience in previous firms. It is not surprising that the tenure effect is weakest in the urban state sector. China's state sector uses a seniority pay system rather than a tenure system such as is typical of large Japanese corporations. In the Chinese system, a worker moving from one state firm to another takes his or her tenure to the new firm. Pay raises and fringe benefits are based on total seniority accumulated throughout the state sector. In the old labor allocation system, voluntary turnover was restricted. Hence, there was no need to tie wages to tenure to reduce worker turnover. The seniority rule simply reduced the friction of administrative reallocation (involuntary mobility). Although the system has been changing since the reform, the seniority rule has not been abolished.
I anticipated that tenure would have a higher return in rural public and private enterprises than in urban state firms. Operating under hard budget constraints, managers and entrepreneurs in rural industry are profit-oriented. They have the motivation and autonomy to reward and retain workers with firm-specific skills. Indeed, the competition for skilled workers among rural enterprises is intensive. Because the administrative barrier to employee turnover is weaker in the rural public sector than it is in the urban state sector, managers must provide monetary incentives to retain skilled employees. Because there is no administrative barrier to employee turnover in the rural private sector, an entrepreneur must provide even more incentives to retain employees who have accumulated experience.
The effect of age is curvilinear in both the rural and urban sectors. Taking income at age 18 as the baseline, the relationship between percent change in income and age is plotted in Figure 3 . In the urban state sector, the age-earnings profile peaks at age 45; in the rural public and private sectors the profile peaks at age 41 and is much steeper.
Since my data are cross-sectional, "age" effects are, in fact, a combination of period effects and true age effects. Although the net percentage differences in income shown in Figure 3 decline with "age" for the older cohorts, the gross differences. seldom do because the loss of physical strength is compensated for by the accumulation of human and social capital. If schooling and onthe-job training were constant across age cohorts, employees in their forties would be the highestpaid group. In rural areas, life expectancy is typically lower and disability comes earlier.
Gender also has a differential effect in the urban state and rural sectors. In the urban state sector, women with the same education, total years of work experience, tenure, and age, earn about 95 percent of men's earnings in state-owned factories, whereas in rural enterprises, the figure is about 87 percent. Compared with American women, for example, Chinese women enjoy greater wage equality. Thus, the formally equal status for women under state socialism seems effective. In the rural sector, gender equality is somewhat attenuated with the loosening of government control.
Occupation differentiates earnings similarly in the rural public and private sectors (equation 2 of 
CONCLUSION
The distinction between public and private/semiprivate ownership of enterprises is not reflected in wage determination in China's rural industries. Nor does the effect of public ownership carry across the rural-urban boundary: Rural public enterprises, which are owned by local governments, behave more like rural private enterprises than like urban public enterprises, which are owned by the state. I believe that rural township governments simply do not have the resources to form a redistributive center. By contrast, when the central government decentralized control over enterprises, provincial and city governments immediately set up bureaucratic redistribution mechanisms of their own. As Kornai would predict, this baffled all efforts at market reform.
Theoretically, market coordination may not depend completely on private ownership. Coordination mechanisms and ownership are two separate and relatively autonomous domains. Their relationship is empirical rather than conceptual. The relationship between the two should not be exaggerated into a necessary connection.
The duality in wage determination suggests an emerging duality in the class stratification systems of China, with two different mechanisms for distributing wealth, power, and privilege. Furthermore, China will not reproduce the situation described by Szelenyi (1988) for Hungary. While Hungarian peasants followed a full-scale embourgeoisement trajectory, Chinese rural industrialization presents a blend of semipublic and semiprivate, semibureaucratic and semientrepreneurial responses.
Understanding stratification in China's rural industry requires that prestige and power stratification as well as income stratification be examined. To fully understand the relationship between ownership and coordination mechanisms requires in-depth institutional analysis of the operation of rural enterprises, including employment relations and financial and administrative relations with township/commune governments. The results of such an analysis should be compared with findings from similar studies of the urban state sector. 
